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MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.,
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vs.
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in Tri-O's opening brief
is accurate and is fairly stated according to the requirement
that this court review the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict.

The statement of facts propounded in

plaintiffs' brief goes beyond the evidence produced at trial
and the reasonable inferences which might be made therefrom.
Plaintiffs' brief states in several places that the job at
which Groen was to fly was seriously behind schedule, attempting to attribute to Tri-0 an incentive to make a warranty.

The

evidence, however, is only that Groen was asked to fly a short
distance across a highway because of arrangements with the

highway patrol.

Tri-O's supervisor, Ken dinger, refused to

concede that the job was seriously behind schedule, despite the
suggestions of plaintiffs' counsel,

dinger testified as

follows:
A.
I don't remember the exact words. I mentioned to him what a bind we were in to get across
that freeway, that arrangements had been made with the
highway patrol and the state highway department,
permits issued, so on and so forth to make that crossing on that particular day.
Q.

You were in a real bind, weren't you?

A.

Basically, yes.

Q.
This job had been moving slowly, you were in
charge, highway patrol's out there. Because you are
in a bind and he objects to the rope to such an extent
that you are worried he's going to shut down after
going over the freeway, didn't you have a little
incentive to say come on, Mr. Groen, the rope's strong
enough?
A.

No.

(Tr. 750.)

dinger also testified that a courier had been sent approximately 100 miles to Denver to obtain Samson rope (Tr. 754).
That testimony obviates the claimed incentive to make a
warranty, because at the time of the alleged warranty the
parties anticipated that the rope would be present the next
morning.
Plaintiffs also dispute Tri-O's contention that the continued rotation of the helicopter blades after the rope became
entangled in the controls lessened the severity of the impact
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by providing the helicopter with at least partial lift. Plaintiffs argue that the force of impact was increased by the rotation of the helicopter blades.

(Respondents* Brief, p. 8.)

The record does not support that conclusion.

Rather, the cited

testimony of Groen (Tr. 101-05, 115-16) only indicates that,
after the rope became entangled in the controls, the blades,
which are normally perpendicular to the helicopter mast,
drooped downward.

Groen's testimony was that the blades struck

the back of the helicopter, which has nothing to do with the
continued lift as the helicopter fell to the ground.
Dr. Orloff confirmed that the damage to the helicopter was
consistent with continued lift and inconsistent with free
fall.

(Tr. 1125-27.)

Further, plaintiffs maintain that Clinger observed Groen's
Leci-uique of flying on both the day of the accident and the day
preceding it, when Groen flew over the freeway.
Brief, pp. 6-7, 20.)

(Respondents'

dinger's testimony, which was not con-

tradicted, was that he only observed Groen fly over the freeway, that during such observation Groen flew extremely slowly,
that he did not observe Groen fly beyond the freeway and that
he did not observe Groen fly at all on the day of the accident.

(Tr. 720-22, 759-62.)

Plaintiffs also maintain that Groen's method of dragging
the lead rope across the tower arms was not unorthodox or
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dangerous.

Plaintiffs' statements, however, are inconsistent.

Plaintiffs assert that "contact between the rope and the tower
arm was unintended and infrequent," yet assert in the next
sentence that "contact with the tower arm is common."
pondents' Brief, p. 6.)

(Res-

Regardless of whether such contact was

common or uncommon, however, the undisputed testimony was that
contact was dangerous and that pilots other than Groen slow
down and carefully lift the rope off the arm when contact
occurs because of the danger of snag.

(Tr. 910-12, 1014-17.)

The accident in this case occurred when the rope snagged on the
tower arm (Tr. 912) (not "near" the arm, as plaintiffs state in
their brief), and Groen was going too fast to stop or release
the rope.
In addition to the foregoing, the following material assertions in the facts section of plaintiffs' brief find no support
in the record (page references are to respondents' brief):
1.
Page 5, "Although dinger denied making the
statements, his denial was impeached to some extent by
prior deposition testimony (tr. 751, 774-775) and
cross examination established doubt as to the truth of
his denial (tr. 754-757)." In his deposition, dinger
merely stated that he did not recall having made the
claimed statement (Tr. 751). The remaining citation
is to redirect examination in which the deposition
statement was repeated.
2.
Pages 5-6, "In order to add credibility to
his statements concerning the adequacy of the rope,
dinger stated to Groen that dinger was knowledgeable
concerning rope strengths and had done extensive reading concerning ropes and their uses." The citations
to the record do not support this statement.
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3.
Page 9, the statement that Groen was one of
the most respected pilots in his field is unsupported. The evidence was that he was "one of the
better known" pilots. (Tr. 1052.)
4.
Page 7, the statement that Himmelfarb was
the world's foremost rope expert is without basis.
5.
Page 9, the reference to the nature of
Groen's service in Vietnam is unsupported.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LAW OF EXPRESS WARRANTY SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED TO THIS CASE.
Plaintiffs analogize this case to cases of express warranties accompanying the lease or bailment of goods. Plaintiffs'
analogy to such warranties is misplaced.

A lease or bailment

of goods is analogous to a sale of such goods; indeed, for some
purposes, this court has considered a lease to be a sale in
substance,

zee FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d

803 (1979).

The instant case, in contrast, involves the sup-

plying of equipment by a contractor to a subcontractor without
transfer of either ownership of the equipment or the incidents
of such ownership, and thus, the alleged warranty does not
constitute the inducement for the exchange and does not become
part of the contract between the parties.
The difference is significant, because the commercial,
contractual inducement for the exchange of goods is the traditional element distinguishing the law of warranty from the law
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of misrepresentation.

Without that element, liability may be

based on a misrepresentation and reliance thereon.

Under the

analysis which plaintiffs apply to this case, liability exists
without any requirement of fault and without any requirement of
intent to form a contract.

The result is strict liability for

misrepresentation, a liability which courts have as a matter of
public policy uniformly refused to accept.
Plaintiffs cite cases involving the law of implied warranty, not express warranty.

Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622

P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah 1980); Acme Crane Rental Co. v. Ideal
Cement Co., 14 Utah 2d 300, 383 P.2d 487, 488 (1963).

This

court, in the prior appeal of this case, refused to extend the
law of implied warranty to the facts of this case and thus
reaffirmed the inapplicability of the cases cited by plaintiffs.

Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 605 (Utah 1983).

The remaining cases cited by plaintiffs, although involving
express warranties, involve distinguishable factual situations.

In Welchman v. Wood, 10 Utah 2d 325, 353 P.2d 165

(1960), the defendant made a representation of fact as part of
the inducement to enter a purchase transaction.

Quagliana v.

Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975),
involved a contract for the provision of professional services.

The defendant architect was hired to prepare plans for

plaintiffs' home, including the necessary plot plan, and told
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plaintiffs that the lot they later purchased was suitable for
the home.

While the court stated that a warranty had been

created, the action was essentially an action for breach of the
contractual duty to provide professional services.
309.

538 P.2d at

Characterizing the assurance as a warranty is analogous

to characterization of a legal opinion letter as a "warranty"
of the conclusion it contains, rather than as a contractual
assumption of a professional duty.

The plaintiffs in Quagliana

paid an agreed monetary consideration for the express and primary purpose of obtaining professional services and assurances
of fact from the architect; in contrast, the plaintiffs in this
case paid no consideration, did not engage the professional
services of Tri-O, and received assurances which, rather than
being the substance of their agreement, were incidental to
another contract.
In both Quagliana and Welchman, the warranty can be considered part of the bargained-for consideration in the transaction, which indicates an objective manifestation of intention
to be bound and provides assurance that the party making the
warranty understands the nature of the undertaking.

See

W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 748 (5th Ed.
1984).

Neither case presented the question of warranties

allegedly made at a job site by a contractor supplying equipment or tools to an employee or subcontractor.
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The fact that the alleged warranty in this case was made in
connection with a contractor's supplying of equipment to a
subcontractor is significant.

In the express warranty cases

cited above, the danger that a warranty may be made inadvertently is negligible.

In the workplace, however, the danger of

inadvertence is substantial, and the opportunity for specific
contractual limitation or protection is virtually absent.

Any

time an employer supplies an employee with tools or equipment
and states that they are adequate for the job, an oral warranty
arises and the employer is exposed to unlimited liability.
The very context in which the workplace warranty arises
demonstrates its unreliability and its unworkable nature.

The

employer/contractor in such cases is denied the benefit of the
statute of frauds or other assurances that the scope of the
warranty will be accurately preserved if an injury later
occurs.

Because of such unreliability, the employer is

severely disadvantaged when he later asserts that the terms of
the warranty were exceeded.

The danger is compounded if the

court accepts plaintiffs' position in this case that all limitations, subjective and objective, must be expressly stated.
This does not leave an injured employee or subcontractor
without a remedy.

The law of negligence, strict liability and

worker's compensation adequately protects the interests of
employees and subcontractors, and the concurrent defenses of
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unforeseeability, comparative fault and assumption of 'the risk
provide workable defenses for the employer/contractor.

Impor-

tation of the law of express warranty to workplace statements
unreasonable and unnecessarily expands the employer's exposure.
Application of the law of express warranty to the facts of
this case creates a great injustice.

Tri-0 is charged with

assumption of a liability in excess of one million dollars,
without negligence or other culpability and based on an obligation which it did not contractually assume.

Tri-0 was denied

the ability to disclaim the warranty, and is not given the
benefit of statutory assurances of reliability which usually
attach to claims of express warranty.

The court's prior deci-

sion in this case has indeed created a liability where none
existed before, and has caught Tri-0 in the transition, leaving
it without a viable defense.
POINT II
THE CLAIMED EXPRESS WARRANTY LACKS CONSIDERATION.
Plaintiffs argue, as anticipated in Tri-O*s opening brief,
that Groen's alleged reliance on the warranty by agreeing to
fly is sufficient consideration for the express warranty.
position plaintiffs advocate is erroneous.

The

As stated in

Tri-01s opening brief, and not refuted in plaintiffs' brief,
the element of consideration must exist separately from claimed

-9-

reliance on the warranty, or the law of warranty, which is
contactual in nature, becomes a vehicle for circumvention of
the longstanding prohibition against liability for innocent
misrepresentation.

Without a requirement of consideration

other than reliance on the alleged warranty, no safeguard
exists preventing any representation, however innocent, from
becoming the basis for absolute liability if the represented
fact turns out to be untrue.
Plaintiffs cite Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975), for the proposition that reliance
alone can constitute consideration for an express warranty.

In

that case, an architect was paid consideration for the express
purpose of giving its expert opinion as to the suitability of a
vacant lot for construction of plaintiffs' home, and gave an
erroneous opinion.

Although the question concerning the lot

was posed subsequent to the initial engagement to review the
plans, the architect testified, and the court specifically
held, that the parties' initial agreement, which was supported
by consideration, included an agreement for site evaluation and
plot plan preparation.

538 P.2d at 309.

The plaintiffs' reli-

ance on the architect's opinion was cited to show that the
breach of the contractual warranty was the cause of plaintiffs'
injury, and was not treated as a substitute for consideration.
The court's subsequent discussion of promissory estoppel was
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based on an alternative factual assumption that the architect
had "promised to place the home on the lot to achieve the
specified view/* 538 P.2d at 310, not that it had warranted
that the home could be so placed.

The distinction between a

promise to perform an affirmative act and a warranty of a
certain set of facts is narrow, but crucial.
Plaintiffs' further argument that the warranty was a modification of an executory contract, based upon an unforeseen
circumstance, finds no support in either the facts or the law.
The Quagliana case, cited by plaintiffs and distinguished
above, does not support the modification theory.

Further, the

argument depends on the fallacious assumption that Groen's
personal option, as pilot in command, to refuse to fly can be
connected to the original contract between Rocky Mountain and
Tri-O.

Thert, is no evidence that Groen was authorized to

negotiate a modification of the contract on behalf of Rocky
Mountain.

Although Groen, as pilot in command, could refuse to

fly, that refusal would still have resulted in a breach of the
contract between Tri-0 and Rocky Mountain if the refusal to fly
was unreasonable.

In any event, the record does not support

the assertion that the polypropylene rope was an "unforeseen
circumstance."

dinger, David, Lederhous and Wehrli all testi-

fied that polypropylene rope was the rope always used on wire
pulling jobs.

(Tr. 710, 905-06, 1021-22, 362-63.)
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Finally, plaintiffs rely on Section 2-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313 (1980), which
enforces a post-sale warranty if it becomes a "basis of the
bargain."

As stated at pages 19 through 24 of Tri-O's opening

brief, reference to the broad provisions of the UCC is inappropriate because Tri-0 has not been given the benefit of the UCC
defenses and limitations which are the quid pro quo for the
broad UCC definition of warranty.
Plaintiffs admit that reliance is the only possible source
of consideration for the warranty claimed in this case.
Acceptance of plaintiffs' claim would result in strict liability for misrepresentation.

Accordingly, the claimed warranty

is unenforceable.
POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND LACK OF
MISUSE WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT,
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
A.

Plaintiffs Failed To Produce Admissible Evidence On
The Issue Of Causation, And Thus Did Not Carry Their
Burden Of Proving Causation.

Plaintiffs argue that the issue of causation must be
resolved in their favor.

Tri-0 asserted at trial that the

failure of the rope did not cause plaintiffs' injuries, because
an equivalent or worse accident would have occurred had the
rope not broken.

The question of causation depends upon scien-

tific analysis of the strengths of the various components of
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the helicopter and of the physical stresses which would have
been applied thereto if the rope had not broken.

Such informa-

tion is outside the ordinary knowledge of laymen, and expert
opinion on the subject was therefore required.

See Day v.

Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186, 189
(1965).
Plaintiffs' argument is based upon the erroneous assumption
that Tri-0 had the burden of proving that the accident would
have happened if the rope had not broken.

The law, however, is

settled that the party claiming the benefits of an express
warranty has the burden of proving that his conduct comes within the terms of the express warranty and that the failure of
the warranted fact caused his injuries.

Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc.

v. Island Le.'- Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1977);
Kuster v. Gculd National Batteries, Inc., 71 Wash. 2d 474, 429
P.2d 220, 227 (1967).

Analyzed in terms of the proper burden

of proof, plaintiffs' position is without merit.
Plaintiffs rely on the testimony of Gary Flandro, whom they
admit is the only person to give an opinion on causation supportive of their position.

They urge that, even if Flandro was

not competent to give an opinion as to causation, his testimony
was nevertheless sufficient to undermine the testimony of Dr.
Orloft, who made a detailed study of the helicopter frame and
determined that the accident would have been worse had the rope
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not broken,, The flaw in this analysis is its premise that
rejection of Dr. Orloft's testimony requires acceptance of
plaintiffs' theory of causation.

It does not.

Rather, if the

jury rejected Dr. Orloft's testimony, it was left with no competent, admissible evidence as to causation, and could only
have speculated as to what would have happened had the rope not
broken.

Because the issue is one which requires expert testi-

mony, and because plaintiffs bore the burden of proof, impeachment of Dr. Orloft would not alone established the issue in
favor of plaintiffs.

Thus, the admissibility of Flandro1s

opinion is crucial.
The problem with Flandro's testimony was not that he was
not qualified to perform the required analysis; rather, the
problem was that his testimony was not based on direct analysis
of the components of the helicopter, and thus was lacking in
foundation.

Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that

the opinion of an expert must be based on facts made known to
the expert at or prior to trial:
The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by or made known to him at or before
the hearing.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Flandro's acceptance of Dr.
Orloft's data.

That reliance, however, is misleading.

Flandro

admitted that in order to reach his conclusion, he had to know
facts which were not in evidence, although they were properly
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factored into Dr. Orloft's analysis as facts made known to him
prior to the hearing and customarily relied upon by experts in
the field.

These facts included the size of the various air-

frame members and the metals of which they were made.

(Tr.

1167. )
Over Tri-O's objection (Tr, 1165), Flandro opined that a
metal bracket would have failed before the structural failure
outlined by Dr. Orloft.

He did so based solely on examination

of a photograph on the witness stand (Tr. 1164-65, 1168-69),
and without having personally inspected the helicopter or
having acquired knowledge of the size or composition of the
structural members of the helicopter. (Tr. 1166-68.)
opinion lacked foundation and was inadmissible.

The

Plaintiffs'

statement that "[i]t was apparent to anyone, including
Dr. Orloft, that the small metal arch would be torn away long
before the helicopter frame would be damaged" (Respondents'
Brief p. 19), is without evidentiary support and is beyond the
bounds of factual presumptions that the court or the jury could
make without the appropriate foundation in expert evidence;
Orloft testified that the strength of the airframe members was
a function of the physics of the stress being applied at any
particular moment.

(Tr. 1181.)

Even if plaintiffs had not had the burden of proof, their
further attempts to impeach Dr. Orloft in their brief are
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without merit.

Plaintiffs assert that Orloft failed to take

into account the tilt of the helicopter at the time of the
snag.

Orloft, however, testified that he had run several

calculations assuming different tilts, and that the tilt of the
helicopter had proven to be inconsequential.

(Tr. 1131-32.)

Further, plaintiffs assert that Orloft admitted that the structural failure he had outlined would not occur if the bracket
identified by Flandro had failed.

Orloft, however reaffirmed

his position that the structural failure he outlined would have
occurred even if the bracket had failed, and further stated
that had the bracket failed and the structural failure not
occurred, Groen would have lost control and the rotors would
have came loose from the helicopter, which would have resulted
in a crash in any event.

(Tr. 1136, 1147-49.)

Flandro's opinion was based on a compound set of speculations which had no support in either the evidence or his personal knowledge.

From that speculative opinion, plaintiffs

request this court to speculate as to what would have happened
if the bracket they identify had failed.
burden of proving causation.

Plaintiffs bore the

Their failure to offer competent,

admissible evidence establishing the element of causation
requires that the issue of causation be resolved in favor of
Tri-O.
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B.

The Lower Court Erred In Failing To Find As A Matter
Of Law That Groen Misused The Rope.

Plaintiffs assert that a warrantor has a duty to state all
restrictions applicable to a warranty, and that if no restrictions are stated, the warranty is unlimited.

In the instant

case, the claimed warranty is that the rope was adequate for
the job and that it would not break.

If plaintiffs' position

is accepted, the court must hold that Tri-0 warranted that the
rope would not break under any circumstances, and must find
that the warranty of adequacy for the job, which by its very
terms implies an external standard, was intended to apply
regardless of whether the job was performed in accordance with
generally accepted practices.

Plaintiffs position is untenable.

Plaintiffs' brief characterizes the limitations which Tri-0
claims must r:-:ist as "subjective" limitations which Clinger
intended but did not state.

This misstates Tri-O's position.

Tri-O's position is that the alleged warranty is subject to
objective limitations and that such limitations apply regardless of whether Clinger actually foresaw the specific limitations now claimed.
It is well-settled law that contracts, such as a contract
for a warranty, are not to be construed in a vacuum, but rather
are to be construed in light of the facts and circumstances
surrounding their inception.
§ 202(a) (1981).

Restatement (2d) of Contracts

If such were not the case in warranty law, a
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warrantor would be placed under the unreasonable and onerous
burden of ascertaining all possible applications of the
warranty and of specifically disclaiming unreasonable uses.
Similarly, the recipient of the warranty would be relieved of
the obligation to exercise due care in assuming risks which
should not reasonably be expected to be within the scope of the
warranty.
The case of J. I. Case Credit Corp. v. Andreason, 90 Idaho
12, 408 P.2d 165 (1965), cited by plaintiffs, is distinguishable.

That case involved an attempt by a seller of a tractor

to orally disclaim a written express warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.

The holding is merely a reflection of the

court's belief that a written express warranty could only be
disclaimed orally if the language used was specific and
adequate to inform the buyer of the disclaimer.

408 P.2d at

169.
Plaintiffs' position illustrates the injustice of applying
the doctrine of express warranty to the facts of this case.
Groen was without dispute an independent contractor, employed
by Rocky Mountain, not Tri-O.

Plaintiffs claim that Groen was

the "pilot in command" and was not required to fly except as
his own knowledge dictated, yet also seek to impose upon Tri-0
a duty to supervise the details of Groen's work.

Further,

plaintiffs would require that Tri-0 continuously monitor and
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modify a warranty which plaintiffs claim was otherwise without
any reasonable limitation whatsoever.
Under the law of negligence, Tri-0 was at the first trial
able to assert that Groen's speed and method of flying were not
foreseeable, and therefore that Tri-01s duty in supplying the
rope did not extend to such conduct, and that Groen assumed the
risk of the consequences of his method of flying.

Forcing

those same facts into the express warranty mold deprived Tri-0
of the ability to compare the fault of the various parties or
to insist that Groen assumed the risk of his own conduct.

The

law of express warranty forces Tri-0 to shoulder the risk of
Groen's conduct and requires Tri-0 to closely supervise Groen's
activities.

Such a burden is unreasonable and cannot and

should be required.
Plaintiffs attempt to isolate portions of the record in
order to support their assertion that Groen's speed and method
were not excessive or dangerous.

Plaintiffs' argument that

Groen's speed and method of flying was not unorthodox is
contrary to the evidence and requires logical assumptions which
do no follow from the premises they assert.

For example,

plaintiffs quote, on pages 21-22 of their brief, the testimony
of Donald Lederhous that there is not a single correct method
of flying wire.

From that testimony, they argue that there is

no evidence that Groen's technique or speed were unorthodox.
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That is a non sequitur.

Although Lederhous testified that

there is no single correct technique for flying wire, he also
testified that Groen's speed was excessive and that his speed
and technique were dangerous.

(Tr. 1010-11, 1023, 1063-66.)

Mr. Patterson corroborated the testimony that 25 to 30 miles
per hour was dangerously fast.

(Tr. 871-72.)

Further, plaintiffs argue that Lederhous testified that he
had pulled wire at 25 miles per hour.

Lederhous explained,

however, that the only time he flew that fast was over a large
canyon where he was a long distance from any pole that the line
could snag on.

(Tr. 1054.)

If the line snags a considerable

distance from the helicopter, and in a situation where a long
span allows the sock line to sag, there is time to react as the
tension is absorbed in the sagging line.

Lederhous was clear

that he had never flown at speeds of 25 miles per hour around
poles while attempting to thread a traveler.

(Tr. 1015, 1017.)

The flaw in plaintiffs' argument is its isolation of the
factors that contributed to the accident in this case.

Speed

alone was not the controlling factor, and plaintiffs' assertion
of margins of error in speed estimates is therefore misleading.

In addition to speed, Groen's method of threading the

travellers created a heightened danger of snag.

No one testi-

fied that any pilot flew as fast as Groen and laid the lead
rope against the insulators or on the tower arm.

This is

significant because the evidence was (1) that when the fly
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travellers are used properly, snags that do occur usually occur
several towers behind the helicopter, so that the rope has a
substantial amount of slack to be taken up before the full
force of the snag hits the lead rope and helicopter (Tr. 1018);
(2) that the snag Groen experienced was a hard snag only 100
feet from the helicopter (Tr. 72-73, 912, 1100); (3) that at
Groen1s speed, the slack in the 100 feet of rope was taken up
in less than one-half second, which made it impossible for him
to utilize the rope release mechanism before the full force of
the snag hit the rope and helicopter (Tr. 1091, 1115-18); and
(4) that if Groen had been going 16 miles per hour, which he
claims was the speed at which the rope would have broken, he
would have had sufficient time to release the rope before the
full force of the snag was applied.

(Tr. 1091, 1102, 1110; Ex.

84.)
Plaintiffs' attempt to fractionalize the multiple factors
contributing to the accident, and to argue that each factor
standing alone would not have caused the accident, is logically
flawed.

Indeed, the approach demonstrates that each of Groen's

variances from ordinary techniques was a cause of the accident
and that, had Groen not employed the combination of techniques
he employed, one or more of the factors contributing to the
accident would have been eliminated and the accident would not
have occurred.

Accordingly, the district court should have

ruled as a matter of law that Groen used the rope outside the
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scope of the alleged warranty and that such misuse caused the
accident.
POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL
BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
Plaintiffs assert that the discovery of the book which
plaintiff Groen co-authored with his brother was not material
and that the failure to fully address the book at trial can
somehow be attributed to Tri-O.

The position is without

merit.

Tri-0 discovered the existence of the book during

trial.

(Supp. R., Affidavit of David G. Williams.)

The record

discloses that Groen concealed the existence of the book until
he was asked about it at trial, despite the numerous opportunities he had to disclose the book during discovery.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 44-46.)

(See

Plaintiffs' assertion that the

book was of little relevance is inapposite; it was not plaintiffs' prerogative to determine that the book was irrelevant
and to fail on that basis to disclose it despite discovery
requests which were clearly calculated to ascertain all sources
of income.
Plaintiffs' further argument regarding sales figures is
without merit.

Plaintiffs assert that Groen did not know what

sales figures were and therefore guessed that the figures were
approximately 20,000, yet also state that an accurate publisher's accounting, which showed figures of 76,810 through
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September, 1984 (see Supp. R.), was "readily available."
Plaintiffs' remaining assertions regarding Groen's level of
participation in the authorship of the book and the likelihood
of his authoring subsequent books is pure speculation and is
absolutely unsupported by the record at trial.

Tri-0 was

entitled to have this information presented to the jury, and
was deprived of that right by plaintiffs' failure to deal
forthrightly with the existence of the book.

A new trial was

therefore appropriate.
POINT V
EXHIBIT 74 WAS ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AND ITS ADMISSION WAS PREJUDICIAL TO
TRI-O.
Exhibit 74 was a summary of selected portions of the testimony of Dr. Samuel Stewart regarding the present value of
Groen's anticipated loss in future earning capability.

It was

admitted after both parties had rested and therefore after the
opportunity for cross-examination had passed.

Although plain-

tiffs argue that the exhibit reflected "some" of the concessions Dr. Stewart made on cross-examination, they do not
dispute, nor can they, that the exhibit failed to reflect Dr.
Stewart's concession that his estimates did not include discounts for present value, and that such discounting would
roughly cut his estimates in half.
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(Tr. 661.)

Thus, the

exhibit did not accurately and fairly summarize Dr. Stewart's
testimony.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED INTEREST ON
CLAIMED SPECIAL DAMAGES.
Plaintiffs' argument that the court properly awarded prejudgment interest on all amounts which Groen claimed as special
damages is flawed.

Plaintiffs claim that Tri-0 has failed to

preserve the record on the issue by failing to object to the
form of the verdict.

The argument presupposes that it was

Tri-O's duty to prepare a verdict form preserving the claimed
right of the plaintiffs.

It is, rather, the duty of the party

desiring the benefit of the special treatment of special
damages to request a verdict from which makes the determination
of interest possible.

Plaintiffs' failure to request such a

form defeats their ability to claim interest on special damages.
Plaintiffs' argument that the jury would have been required
to find Groen entitled to all special damages is also without
merit.

There was, as detailed in Tri-O's opening brief, sub-

stantial medical testimony that Groen's complaints were not all
related to the accident.

The jury was not required to believe

that all of his complaints and medical treatments were caused
by the accident.

In fact, Dr. Soderberg, Groen*s own treating

physician and expert witness, on cross-examination admitted
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that he cautioned Groen against excessive chiropractic treatments.

(Tr. 576-78.)

Some of the claimed special damages were

chiropractor bills.
The jury was not required to accept plaintiffs' contention
that all of the bills were reasonably and necessarily incurred
as a result of the accident.

Plaintiffs' implication at page

31 of their brief that Tri-0 stipulated to the reasonableness
and necessity of all such damages is unsupported and unsupportable.

The court erred in presuming in the face of conflicting

evidence that the jury would have awarded all claimed special
damages.

Its award of interest on the full amount of claimed

special damages was therefore erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
judgment entered for defendant.

In the alternative, the case

should be remanded for new trial.

At minimum, the court's

award of prejudgment interest on special damages must be overturned .
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3vx| day of October, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

i
By

-

«

\ _.,
H. Jarhes C\egg
David G. Williams
Rodney R. Parker
Attorneys for Appellant

SCM1434R
-25-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief to be served by first class mail on
October 3, 1985, upon the following:
Robert M. McDonald
Commercial Security Bank Tower
50 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Rodney R\ Paitee

-26-

